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1 Introduction
Electricity markets worldwide have undergone a process of liberalisation in recent decades.
Electricity generation, which was the preserve of state-owned vertically integrated utilities,
is now a competitive industry. However, electricity market structures differ from one
country to the next. One of the significant differences that can arise between markets
is whether they have a specific capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM), and if so, the
form it takes.
A CRM aims to compensate generation firms for owning generation capacity, regardless
of the extent to which it is utilised. An electricity market which includes a CRM is
usually considered as the alternative to an ‘energy-only’ market, in which generators are
compensated on the basis of the energy they generate only. Electricity cannot be easily or
economically stored, and blackouts or brownouts are not socially or politically acceptable.
There is thus a requirement for sufficient generation capacity to meet demand at all hours
of the year, including peak demand hours, and so some peaking units are required which
cannot expect to generate for more than a few hours per year. Ensuring sufficient revenue
to render such units economically viable is the main reason for CRMs.
There are several arguments put forward as to why such low-load units would not
prove viable in the absence of a CRM. The first is the absence of an active demand-side
in electricity generation markets, which means that consumers cannot signal their desired
level of reliability of supply (Cramton and Stoft, 2005). There is therefore a weaker price
signal for reliable supply, and consequently for electricity generation capacity. There is also
an opportunity and incentive to exercise market power, particularly in the period close to
real time. Another argument in favour of CRMs is the the shared nature of the electricity
network. This introduces a ‘free-rider’ problem, whereby it is not possible to differentiate
between consumers who had entered into a contract for reliable supply. The imposition
of price caps in electricity markets, often for political reasons, is also argued to reduce
investment incentives for low-load units (Grigorjeva, 2015). Finally it can be argued that
electricity has public good characteristics (Abbott, 2001), and so policy-makers may be
reluctant to leave the secure supply of generation capacity to market forces. Each of these
factors, alone or in combination, mean that generators face a ‘missing money’ problem in
relation to recovering their fixed costs (Stoft, 2002). Thus separate capacity remuneration
mechanisms have been proposed as a means of compensating generators for the cost of
holding capacity, separate from providing energy (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2012; Cramton
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and Stoft, 2008; Botterud and Doorman, 2008).
In recent years, the increase of variable renewable generation, such as wind and pho-
tovoltaic solar, in modern power systems has given rise to more calls for some form of
CRM. Such generation is semi-dispatchable (i.e. can only be dispatched down) and has
zero or near-zero marginal costs. Thus the units enter the market at the bottom of the
supply curve and displace thermal generators, as well as depressing the prices earned by
all generators in the spot market. However, given the fact that the output of renewable
generators is variable and relatively unpredictable, there is still a need for excess ther-
mal generation units to ensure sufficient supply at all hours of the year. These effects
exacerbate the ‘missing money’ problem (Cramton and Stoft, 2008).
Capacity markets exist in several markets worldwide to date. In the USA, capacity
markets exist in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM), New York Independent
System Operator (NYISO) and the Mid-Atlantic System Operator (MISO) markets. The
European Commission is skeptical at best on the requirement for CRMs (European Com-
mission, 2013). However according to Caldecott and McDaniels (2014), in 2013 European
energy companies announced mothballing of over 20 GW of gas power plants, giving rise to
concerns that capacity remuneration was necessary. At present in Europe, capacity pay-
ments exist or are planned in Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and Ireland and are under
consideration in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (CREG, 2012). For
an extended discussion on the capacity payments under consideration, see ACER (2013)
or CREG (2012).
Capacity mechanism designs can be broadly categorised as ‘price-based’ or ‘quantity-
based’ ACER (2013). Price-based mechanisms provide a regulated payment designed to
mimic the inframarginal-rent an otherwise-marginal generator would receive, and is dis-
tributed equally among all generators. Quantity-based mechanisms see supply companies
or the System Operator contracting ahead for a fixed amount of capacity, typically equal
to the expected peak demand in a given period. Within each of the price and quantity
categories there are numerous types of CRMs; for an overview see Botterud and Doorman
(2008) and for a more detailed discussion see De Vries (2007).
While capacity markets are found in many modern electricity markets and are under
consideration in many more, the optimal design of CRMs is an area of active research.
Hobbs et al. (2007) considers the implications of using dynamic demand curves rather than
specific demand targets in quantity-based mechanisms, and finds that demand curves re-
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duces costs and risk for consumers and producers. Khalfallah (2011) use a dynamic model
under Cournot competition, and find that ‘market-based’ mechanisms are more efficient
than non-market based mechanisms in securing generation investment, but that under
cartel and monopolistic situations market-based mechanisms increase installed capacities
and consumer costs. Meyer and Gore (2014) consider the cross-border effects of using
strategic reserve and reliability options to ensure capacity adequacy in two interconnected
markets.
One question which has not been addressed in the literature is the extent to which the
reliability of the units themselves impacts on capacity payments, and whether and how
to incentivise generators to invest in refurbishing existing generation capacity in order to
improve their reliability. The reliability of a unit can be broadly interpreted, but it should
not be ignored in capacity payment design1. The reliability can be thought of as the
number of hours of the year where the unit can be expected to be available for generation.
In terms of thermal generators, the reliability is therefore one minus the forced outage
rate, whereas for a renewable generator the reliability is a function of the weather, and is
linked to the capacity value of the unit in question.
The reliability of generation units has an impact on market clearing prices, both di-
rectly, by seeing market prices increase when units are unavailable to generate, and in-
directly, by inducing different levels of investment by generation firms, which impacts on
market-clearing prices. Thus, the price paid by consumers, the total reliability of the sys-
tem, the final levels of generation and the profits of generators are all dependant to some
extent on the reliability of generation units. This paper considers the equilibrium prices
and generation capacity that arise on a system with unreliable units.
The paper considers these market outcomes when generators, each with a given reli-
ability, compete in a market that includes energy and capacity payments. We consider
one price-based capacity payment mechanism and one quantity-based capacity payment
mechanism, both of which are found in energy markets. The effect of refurbishment of
exiting units, and the impact on prices and unserved energy, is considered. A case study
is presented with stylised generation firms. Cost parameters are chosen from a variety
of sources and reliability and elasticity parameters are taken from the Single Electricity
Market (SEM) of Ireland.
In order to model these markets, we construct the problem as a stochastic Mixed
1The appropriate design of penalties in the case of nondelivery of energy by units in receipt of capacity
payments, for example, is a difficult issue that has not been resolved
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Complementarity Problem (MCP). MCPs allow the optimisation problems of multiple
players (in our case we consider multiple electricity generation firms) to be solved in
equilibrium by comparing the Karush-Khun-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality of
each of the players and connecting them via market clearing conditions (Gabriel et al.,
2012).
The stochasticity of the models arises from the uncertainty surrounding the availability
of units in any given period. As we wish to compare the effects of investing in new units and
refurbishing existing units, we allow firms to invest in refurbishment, which increases the
probability of their unit being available. Thus the stochastic MCPs we employ incorporate
endogenous probabilities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the mathe-
matical formulation of the three different capacity remuneration mechanisms considered.
Section 3 describes the input data used. Section 4 outlines the results obtained. Section
5 discusses the results and section 4.1.2 concludes.
2 Methodology
Consider the case of n generation firms. The firm’s objective is to maximise profits, which
they earn in both energy and capacity markets.
We compare three different capacity payment mechanisms. The first mechanism is a
price-based mechanism, whereby a capacity pot is calculated on the basis of the investment
cost of new generation multiplied by the amount of generation required to meet the peak
electricity demand. Thus, the pot is calculated so as to mimic the inframarginal rent an
otherwise-marginal unit would require in order to break even, as mentioned above. This
pot is divided evenly among all generators on the basis of their capacity2.
The second mechanism is a quantity-based capacity payment mechanism, whereby
generators compete in an auction to hold reliability options. Generators in possession
of reliability options can be called on by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) to
generate at a predetermined strike price during times of system stress, thereby shielding
consumers from very high spot prices. For a full description of reliability options see
Va´zquez et al. (2002).
The models for each of the mechanisms are outlined below.
2This resembles the capacity payment mechanism which is in place in the Single Electricity Market
(SEM) of Ireland at present (CER and NIAUR, 2006)
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2.1 Capacity pot mechanism
2.1.1 Firm f ’s problem
Firm f maximises their profits by choosing the amount of generation, refurbishment of
existing capacity, investment in new capacity and decommissioning of existing capacity as
follows:
max
invf,t,
genf,t,p,
exitf,t
refurbf,t
Πf = max
invf,t,
genf,t,p,
exitf,t
refurbf,t
∑
t
(
(invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t) ∗ cp− (invf,tICOSTt)
− (CAPf,t − exitf,t)MCOSTt − refurbf,tRCOSTt
)
+
∑
t,p,s
prsBf,t,sgenf,t,p,s
(
γp,s −MCt
)
(1)
subject to:
genf,t,p,s ≤ invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t, ∀t, p, s (λ1f,t,p,s), (2)
Rf,t + refurbf,t ≤ Rf,t ∀t, (λ2f,t), (3)
where t represents different energy technologies and p represents different time periods.
The decision variables for firm f are invf,t, exitf,t, genf,t,p,s and refurbf,t representing
market investment, market exit, generation and refurbishment decisions respectively. Each
scenario s represents a different combination of units being available/unavailable.
The energy price at each period for scenario s is (γp,s) while cp is the capacity price paid
for each unit of installed capacity. The prices γp,s and cp are exogenous to firm f ’s problem
but are variables of the overall problem. The parameters RCOSTt, ICOSTt, MCOSTt
are the costs of refurbishment, investment in new generation and the maintenance cost
of existing generation3 for each unit respectively, while CAP and MC are the initial
endowment of generation capacity and the marginal cost of production of each technology,
respectively. The parameter Bf,t,s is a binary indicator, describing whether firm f with
technology t is available (Bf,t,s = 1) or unavailable (Bf,t,s = 0) in scenario s. The reliability
(or probability of being available) for firm f with technology t is Rf,t+refurbf,t where Rf,t
3New investments are considered to have a lower maintenance cost, and so MCOST can be thought of
as the premium on maintenance costs for existing capacity over and above new capacity.
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is a parameter representing initial reliability before refurbishment. Hence the probability
associated with scenario s is:
prs =
∏
f,t
(Rf,t + refurbf,t)Bf,t,s(1−Rf,t − refurbf,t)1−Bf,t,s . (4)
Constraint (2) ensures that generation for given unit and time period cannot exceed
the amount of installed capacity while constraint (3) provides an upper bound for the
reliability of each unit. The variables in brackets alongside constraints (2) and (3) are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with those constraints. All primal (decision) variables of
this problem are also constrained to be non-negative.
2.1.2 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions that combine each of the firms’ problems are
∑
f,t
Bf,t,s ∗ genf,t,p,s = Zp − E ∗ γp,s, ∀p, s(γp,s), (5)
POT = cp
(∑
f,t
invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t
)
, (cp), (6)
where Zp is the intercept of the demand curve for period p and E is a parameter rep-
resenting the elasticity of demand. In this way, total generation is constructed in equation
(5) as a linear function of demand and its elasticity, which follows the approach of Khalfal-
lah (2011). Equation (6) specifies that the capacity pot, which is set administratively and
so is exogenous to the problem, should be divided evenly between all installed generation.
The prices γp,s and cp are the free Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints.
As each firm’s problem is convex, the Karush-Khun-Tucker conditions are both nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for optimality. The overall model is thus a mixed com-
plementarity problem (MCP) given by the KKT equations for each firm, along with the
market clearing conditions (5) and (6). The full model is outlined in the appendix.
2.2 Reliability options mechanism
In the second mechanism, the firms receive capacity revenues from a quantity-based reli-
ability options mechanism. The reliability options are allocated to firms at a price deter-
mined by a competitive auction. The objective function and constraints for each firm are
similar to the pot without reliability mechanism above, with the addition that generators
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offer capacity into an auction and some of their capacity wins a reliability option. There is
thus a new variable, cap rof,t, which denotes the generation capacity owned by each firm
and technology that wins a reliability option. Firms holding reliability options must also
repay the difference between the spot price and a predetermined strike price when spot
prices are higher than the strike price.
2.2.1 Firm f ’s problem
As in Section 2.1, firm f maximises its profits by choosing the amount of generation,
refurbishment of existing capacity, investment in new capacity and decommissioning of
existing capacity. Additionally it now also chooses how much capacity to offer in a relia-
bility options auction as follows:
max
invf,t,
genf,t,p,
exitf,t
refurbf,t
cap rof,t
Πf = max
invf,t,
genf,t,p,
exitf,t
refurbf,t
cap rof,t
∑
t
(
cap rof,tcp− invf,tICOSTt
− (CAPf,t − exitf,t)MCOSTt − refurbf,tRCOSTt
)
+
∑
t,p,s
prs
((
Bf,t,sgenf,t,p,s(γp,s −MCt)
)− cap rof,trebatep,s)
(7)
subject to:
genf,t,p,s ≤ invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t, ∀t, p, s (λ1f,t,p,s), (8)
Rf,t + refurbf,t ≤ Rf,t ∀t, (λ2f,t), (9)
cap rof,t ≤ invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t, ∀t, (λ3f,t), (10)
where all previously mentioned indices, decision variables and parameters are as described
in Section 2.1. The variable rebatep,s represents the unit price rebate that each firm f pays
in period p for scenario s for the capacity for which they hold a reliability option. This price
is exogenous to firm f ’s problem but is a variable of the overall mixed-complementarity
problem. In addition to the extra decision variable (cap rof,t) being constrained to being
non-negative, the reliability options mechanism problem also has an extra constraint which
ensures that capacity offered in the reliability options auction by firm f for technology t
cannot exceed its installed capacity (see equation (10)). The variable λ3f,t is the Lagrange
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multiplier associated with this constraint.
2.2.2 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions include the condition that all elastic demand must be
met, as in the first problem, along with a constraint that the total number of reliability
options awarded must reach the predetermined target set by the regulator. The Lagrange
multipliers associated with these constraints are γp,s and cp, respectively. The rebate
paid by firms holding reliability options also acts as a market clearing condition. The
rebate is paid when the electricity price, gammap,s, rises above a strike price, SP , which
is determined administratively and is known to the firms in advance. The market clearing
conditions are:
∑
f,t
Bf,t,sgenf,t,p,s = Zp − E ∗ γp,s, ∀p, s(γp,s), (11)
TARGET =
∑
f,t
cap rof,t, (cp), (12)
rebatep,s = max(γp,s − SP, 0) (rebatep,s). (13)
As previously each firm’s problem is convex. Hence, the Karush-Khun-Tucker con-
ditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. The overall model is
thus a MCP given by the KKT equations for each firm, along with the market clearing
conditions (11) - (13). The full model is outlined in the appendix.
3 Input data
We solve the model for a simplified system with three generation technologies, five time
periods and four generation firms. The five time periods represent summer low demand,
summer high demand, winter low demand, winter high demand and winter peak demand.
Intertemporal constraints are not considered and so the sequence of the demand periods
is not relevant; for simplicity we show the demand intercept in each period in ascending
order:
Period 1 2 3 4 5
Demand (MW) 300 500 750 900 1500
Table 1: Demand intercept (Zp) in each period
We consider three generation technologies which we denote as baseload, midmerit and
8
peaking capacity. We consider pulverised coal to be roughly representative of baseload
units, combined cycle gas plants as representing midmerit units and open cycle gas turbines
as the peaking technology for this study. We consider the investment and maintenance
costs to be fixed, as per Shortt et al. (2013) and Hirth (2013) respectively, and use the
marginal costs of production from Shortt et al. (2013). Sensitivities were conducted using
different marginal costs and they did not impact on the final results. The cost character-
istics are given in table 2.
Technology Investment (ICOST ) Maintenance (MCOST ) Marginal cost (MC)
t (âĆň/MW) (âĆň/MW) (âĆň/MWh)
Baseload 100000 25 65
Mid merit 65000 12 40
Peaking 45000 7 83
Table 2: Generation cost characteristics
Firm one is an integrated firm, with investments in all three generation technologies.
Firm two has baseload capacity only, firm three has midmerit capacity only and firm four
has peaking capacity only. The quantities of each are given in table 3.
t f = 1 f = 2 f = 3 f = 4
Baseload 300 300 0 0
Mid merit 200 0 200 0
Peaking 200 0 0 200
Table 3: Initial capacities (CAPf,t) of each firm (MW)
The total generation capacity is 1400MW, which falls 100MW short of peak demand
in period 5. Thus at least 100MW of investment will be required.
The strike price (SP ) in the reliability options mechanism is set equal to the marginal
cost of the most expensive unit, in this case the peaking units. The recommendation in
Va´zquez et al. (2002) (in which reliability options were originally proposed) is that the
strike price should be 25% above the incremental cost of the most expensive unit, while
Cramton and Stoft (2005) recommends setting the strike price at the cost of the most
expensive unit. However, the strike price can be set at a higher (or indeed a lower) level
if desired.
The initial levels of reliability (Rf,t)of installed capacity are considered fixed for each
technology and firm. These reliability levels can be thought of as the forced outage rates of
the units and are based on forced outage rates of units found on the Irish system as per the
regulators’ validated model for studying the Irish system (CER and NIAUR, 2013). The
forced outage rate takes a value between zero and one, where zero indicates no reliability
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(i.e. the unit will be continually on forced outage) and one indicates guaranteed reliability
(the unit will always be available when required). In other words, Rf,t is the probability
of being available to generate at each period4. These initial levels are given in table 4.
Midmerit units tend to have slightly lower levels of reliability than baseload units as they
are cycled more frequently (Troy et al., 2010), which adds to wear and tear on the units,
and lower reliability than peaking units, as midmerit plants are online more frequently.
Peaking units are used least often and so have higher reliability.
Baseload Midmerit Peaking
Reliability 0.965 0.955 0.985
Table 4: Initial levels of reliability for each technology and firm
Given these initial levels of reliability for baseload and midmerit units, there are six
units with reliability of less than one. Hence, there are 26 = 64 scenarios which must be
considered, representing each possible combination of units available for generation. The
probability associated with each of these scenarios is a function of the units’ reliability.
The cost of refurbishment (RCOSTf,t) is a continuous variable given as a proportion
of the investment cost. Thus to increase a unit’s reliability from 0.4 to 0.5 costs one tenth
of the investment cost. While this is a simplification, the rationale for this is that no
increase in reliability should cost nothing, and to raise the reliability of a unit from zero
to one entails building a new unit5. The reliability of new investments is assumed to be
equal to one, i.e., a new build is as reliable as any unit can be expected to be.
The elasticity of demand on the island of Ireland is calculated in Di Cosmo and Hyland
(2013) as -0.16, which is in line with international estimates. Following the methodology in
Walsh and Malaguzzi Valeri (2014) we use the elasticity of demand (E) for the wholesale
electricity market of -0.11.
4 Results
The model is solved for both capacity payment mechanisms with and without the possi-
bility of investing in refurbishment. The generic algebraic modelling system (GAMS) was
used to solve the models, employing the PATH solver.
4Note that the reliability of each unit in independent of the period; i.e. the probability of being available
to generate in a given period is independent of its availability in the previous period
5Future work will examine this assumption in more detail
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 1: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with no refurbishment
4.1 Results without refurbishment
The pot mechanism and reliability options models are first run without taking considera-
tion of potential refurbishments, i.e., they are run with the variable refurbf,t set equal to
zero for all firms and technologies.
4.1.1 Base case
Figure 1 depicts the electricity prices, investment, generation, market shares and profits
per megawatt installed capacity arising under both capacity payment mechanisms.
Figure 1a shows the expected electricity price at each period, i.e. the price at each
scenario weighted by the probability of the scenario (∑s probs ∗ γp,s). There is little
difference in the electricity prices arising under the two models with the exception of
period 5. In this period the market price is higher under reliability options, but due to the
rebate mechanism consumers are not exposed to this high price. The weighted average of
unserved demand in each period again only diverges in period 5, where there is slightly
higher generation (i.e. slightly lower unserved demand) under the pot mechanism.
The reason for this difference in unserved demand in period 5 may be explained by
figure 1c, which shows the total generation investments by each firm6. Given the initial
6All firms invest in peaking capacity only. A multi-period analysis may see investment in baseload or
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1400MW of installed generation capacity, and the 1500MW of reliability options available,
there is only 100MW of investment under the reliability options model. Given the fact that
units do not have 100% reliability, this brings about scenarios where there is insufficient
generation available to meet all demand. Under the pot mechanism, however, there is a
higher level of investment, leading to a more reliable system overall and thus less unserved
demand. This is in spite of the fact that the pot was chosen to induce the same amount
of total investment - indeed, the capacity price arising from the reliability options model
is equal to the cost of peaking units, and so the total payout from consumers for capacity
is equal to the size of the pot under the pot mechanism. Thus, a pot mechanism may lead
to overcapacity relative to the reliability options model.
No exit of existing generation takes place under this scenario and so the generation
capacity market shares are determined on the basis of the existing capacity and the 100MW
of new generation. As firms two and three are the only firms to invest the dominant
position of firm one is lessened somewhat under both models. This is because firm one can
earn the same revenues without incurring the cost of investment, and so by not investing,
firm one earns higher profits per MW installed capacity than the firms that do invest. The
profits of firm four are equal to those of firm one, as firm four also does not invest and so
has no investment cost.
In terms of the cost to consumers, the prices and the capacity pots are similar. How-
ever, the rebate mechanism under reliability options leads to lower final costs, as the
difference between the cost of the most expensive unit (e83 per MWh) and the price in
period 5 is repaid to the consumer. Thus from our initial position of slight underinvest-
ment, the reliability options model leads to a lower consumer cost, but the pot mechanism
induces higher investment, which brings about more reliability and lower levels of unserved
demand, while reducing profits for the firms in question.
4.1.2 Varying market concentration
The simulation was repeated with the same amount of total installed capacity, but chang-
ing the proportions of capacity held by each firm as per tables 6 and 5. The results are
shown in figure 2.
The results in this scenario exhibit the same patterns as the base case and concentration
in the market does not appear to have an impact on the arising prices and generation
midmerit technologies
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Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Baseload 200 400 0 0
Mid merit 100 0 300 0
Peaking 100 0 0 300
Table 5: Initial capacity endowments (CAPf,t) with low market concentration (MW)
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Baseload 400 200 0 0
Mid merit 300 0 100 0
Peaking 300 0 0 100
Table 6: Initial capacity endowments (CAPf,t) with high market concentration (MW)
(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 2: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with varying levels of initial
concentration
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 3: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with varying levels of initial
reliability
levels. This is due to the fact that entry is not restricted, and so the possibility of new
entry mitigates against the incumbants’ opportunity to exercise market power.
4.1.3 Varying reliability
The analysis is repeated varying the initial levels of reliability according to table 7. The
results are shown in figure 3.
Reliability (Rf,t) Baseload Midmerit Peaking
Low 0.95 0.84 0.98
High 0.985 0.98 0.1
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis on the initial levels of reliability for each technology and firm
Unsurprisingly, expected market prices in period 5 rise under decreased reliability, as
the probability of a unit being unavailable, and hence the probability of the associated
scenarios arising, is increased. The expected unserved energy also increases, particularly
in the case of reliability options. The investments undertaken under the reliability options
model are the same in both cases (100MW in total), but there is increased investment by
the pot mechanism under low reliability. This again shows that, as argued in the base
case, higher levels of investment prove optimal in order to allow generators to provide
14
(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 4: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with initial over and under
capacity
generation in spite of the unreliability of their generators. Thus the increased investment
improves the reliability of the system without imposing extra costs on consumers. This
again leads to lower profits for firms two and three under the pot mechanism relative to
the reliability options model.
4.1.4 Varying initial capacities
The analysis is repeated for initial levels of over and under capacity according to tables 8
and 9. The resuls are shown in figure 4.
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Baseload 200 200 0 0
Mid merit 100 0 100 0
Peaking 100 0 0 100
Table 8: Initial capacity endowments (CAPf,t) with undercapacity (MW)
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Baseload 400 400 0 0
Mid merit 300 0 300 0
Peaking 300 0 0 300
Table 9: Initial capacity endowments (CAPf,t) with overcapacity (MW)
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The effect of under and overcapacity on prices and unserved demand is as one would
expect. Interestingly, the unserved demand does not fall to zero even with significant over-
capacity. There is no new investment in the case with overcapacity and the pot mechanism
sees slightly more investment relative to reliability options with undercapacity, in keeping
with the pattern observed above. In the undercapacity scenario, the capacity price falls
to e22 per MW, leading to much lower costs for consumers and much lower profits for
generators. Generators’ profits per MW installed capacity fall under overcapacity relative
to undercapacity with the pot mechanism, as the same pot must be spread over a smaller
number of generators. However this was not enough to induce market exit by firms, either
under the pot model or the reliability options model, as firms were still making a positive
profit per MW of installed generation.
A further sensitivity with an extremely high level of overcapacity (ten times the initial
amount) was performed. There was still no exit under the pot mechanism, as the payment
per MW installed was still higher than the maintenance cost. However exit did take place
under the reliability options model, leaving a total of 2703MW installed. Thus initial
overcapacities of more than this amount would see exit (depending on the initial reliability
of the units).
The reliability options were distributed evenly across the technology types and firms
according to figure 5. The rebate mechanism operates such that a generator holding
an option must repay the rebate to the system operator regardless of whether the unit
was scheduled. Thus it is in firms’ interest to hold both reliability options and back-
up generation, to reduce the probability of their being called on to repay the difference
between the strike price and the reference price while being unable to generate due to
being on forced outage. This may explain the lack of exit by firms under the reliability
options model.
4.1.5 Varying elasticities
Finally the analysis is repeated for different levels of price elasticity of demand of 0.05 and
0.2. The results are presented in figure 6.
The results under varying elasticities follow the same patterns as above, with prices
and unserved demand rising as elasticity decreases. The investment decisions again see
the reliability options model investing only in the generation necessary to reach the total
target amount of capacity.
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Figure 5: Reliability options held by each firm with over-capacity
(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 6: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with varying levels of elasticity
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 7: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with refurbishment
In general it seems that in the absence of refurbishment options, a pot mechanism
leads to lower costs to consumers along with a slightly lower level of unserved demand and
a more reliable system. Even in the case of overcapacity, no market exit takes place.
4.2 Results with refurbishment
We repeat the analysis including the refurb variable and equations; all other inputs are
as per section 4.1.1 above.
4.2.1 Base case
The results under the base case are shown in figure 7. All firms invest in refurbishment
of midmerit and baseload units to the maximum extent possible, bringing their reliability
levels to one. Refurbishment does not take place of firm one’s existing peaking capacity
under the pot mechanism; however firm 4, the firm with investments in peaking capacity,
does refurbish its units. Under reliability options, maximum refurbishment takes place.
The increased reliability of the units on the system reduces the peak prices seen in period
5, which were being influenced by the capacity investment cost in the previous models
without refurbishment. This lowers costs to consumers under the pot mechanism (as
consumers were not exposed to the costs under the reliability options mechanism in any
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 8: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with refurbishment and vary-
ing initial levels of concentration
case) relative to the non-refurbishment model. This decrease in prices in period 5 means
that the total costs to the consumer is equal under the two mechanisms, as the capacity
price in the reliability options model again clears at the cost of investment in peaking
capacity.
The levels of unserved demand have also fallen, confirming that the forced outage of
units was to some degree responsible for unserved demand. Given the refurbishment of
all baseload and midmerit units, the unserved demand in periods 1-4 is not due to forced
outage, and is instead the firms’ optimal level of output given the elasticity of demand.
Investment under each model is now 100MW, as the refurbishment reduced the need
for surplus investment to meet demand. The profits for each firm reflect their investment
decisions.
4.2.2 Varying market concentration
The analysis is repeated with a higher level of concentration in the market, as per section
4.1.2 above. The results are shown in figure 8.
The investments in refurbishment are the same as the base case for baseload and
midmerit units. However, in the case of peaking units, firm one does not invest in refur-
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 9: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with refurbishment and vary-
ing initial levels of reliability
bishment in the low-concentration input set, while firm four does not refurbish its peaking
units in the high-concentration input set. The unserved energy is therefore about 1MW
higher in period five under the pot mechanism. The energy prices in period five under
the pot mechanism are slightly higher for both higher and lower concentration than that
seen under the base case. However the total increase in costs to consumers relative to the
reliability options scenario, is less than 0.3% (while in the basecase the difference in costs
to consumers was 0.06%).
The integrated firm does not invest in new capacity under either sensitivity, and so
earns highest profits in both cases. The profits of other firms reflect their investment
decisions.
4.2.3 Varying reliability
The analysis is repeated with a higher level of initial reliability, as per section 4.1.3 above.
The results are shown in figure 9.
Maximum refurbishment once again takes place in all technologies, as in case 4.1.3
above. The prices seen under the pot mechanism are higher than those under the reliability
options model for low initial levels of reliability. The increase in costs to consumers is still
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 10: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with refurbishment and
initial over and undercapacity
low however, less than 0.8% of total costs compared to the reliability options case.
The unserved demand is the same for the pot and the reliability options mechanism
under both input sets, although the unserved demand is much higher under the input set
with high initial reliability.
There is slightly higher investment under the pot mechanism with low reliability, with
110MW of investment overall. Thus, we again see higher levels of new investment to
compensate for low reliability, and this gives rise to the increase in prices in period 5. The
reliability options mechanism and the pot mechanism with high reliability see 100MW
investment each. The investments under reliability options are spread over firms 2-4 while
the investment under the pot mechanism is by firms 2 and 3 only, leading to different
investment costs and thus profits.
4.2.4 Varying initial capacity
The analysis is repeated using initial over and undercapacity, as in 4.1.4. The refurbish-
ment decisions are the same as under previous input sets.
Under the reliability options model, market exit takes place according to figure 11,
leaving only 1500MW of installed capacity. There is no exit under the pot mechanism.
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Figure 11: Market exit with initial overcapacity
Under the overcapacity input set, the capacity price in the reliability options model
collapses to e7 per MW. For the first time with refurbishment, there is a different final
resulting cost to consumers under the two models, with the reliability options model
resulting in a 25% decrease in costs to consumers. This also leads to significantly reduced
profits for generators with the reliability options model and overcapacity. The price and
unserved demand follow the same patterns as observed in previous input sets.
4.2.5 Varying elasticity
Finally the analysis is repeated for varying levels of elasticity, as per section 4.1.5.
The refurbishment decisions follow the same pattern as before. Under the lower elas-
ticity of demand of 0.05, the probability-weighted price in period 5 increases from e83
per MWh to e136 per MWh under the pot mechanism. Consumers are exposed to this
increase in price, and so total consumer payments under the pot mechanism increase by
approximately 1% compared to the reliability options mechanism (the cost of the reliabil-
ity options mechanism again clears at the same cost of the pot). The unserved demand is
also slightly higher under this input set.
Low elasticity of demand induced higher overall investment under the pot mechanism.
As before, reliability options lead to exactly 100MW of investment under both models.
The integrated firm again fails to invest, and so sees higher profits than its competitors.
5 Discussion
In the models that omit refurbishment, the higher levels of prices seen in peak periods
mean that the pot mechanism imposes a higher cost on consumers relative to the reliability
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(a) Expected electricity prices in each period (b) Expected total generation each period
(c) Investment in new capacity by each firm
(d) Expected profits per megawatt installed ca-
pacity
Figure 12: Results under both capacity payment mechanisms with refurbishment and
varying initial levels of elasticity
options mechanism - between 2% and 7%, depending on the input set. This is due to the
forced outages of units increasing the price in the peak period, and under the pot mech-
anism this increase in price is passed on to the consumer. However, the pot mechanism
also induces higher levels of investment, and therefore lower levels of unserved energy.
Thus it appears that the rebate penalty used here is not sufficient to induce investment in
new capacity to ensure security of supply in the case of reliability options, and only the
target level of investment occurs. This is in spite of the fact that the strike price is set at
the marginal cost of the most expensive unit, while the literature recommends setting the
strike price at up to 25% above this level. There may therefore be a case for introducing
extra penalties during period of non-delivery in order to encourage refurbishment of units.
In the case of over-capacity, however, market exit does not take place under the relia-
bility options mechanism, and unserved energy declines. Therefore a system with overca-
pacity will see higher levels of reliability and lower prices. However, the reliability options
mechanism clears at a very low price, reducing total costs for consumers by 20%, indicating
that if a system has overcapacity a reliability options framework may lower costs.
In summary, when considering the case of nonrefurbishment, there is a tradeoff between
higher costs to consumers and higher levels of unserved demand in choosing the capacity
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payment mechanism.
When refurbishment is included, high levels of refurbishment take place, reducing the
need for overinvestment. The total capacity on the system is therefore 1500MW for all
scenarios (apart from the case of overcapacity under the pot payment), electricity prices are
equal to the marginal costs of production in most periods and the payouts from consumers
under reliablity options and the pot mechanism in general are the same.
The two exceptions regarding the costs to consumers are in the case of low elasticity
of demand, where prices rise in period five, increasing costs to consumers in the pot case
only, and again in the case of overcapacity, where the reliability options payment clears at
a low level. In these cases the consumer payment under reliability options is 1% and 25%
lower than in the case of the pot mechanism, respectively.
If policy makers place a high premium on having sufficient capacity to meet demand
but no more, and if a system has significant overcapacity, reliability options may be the
best choice for the system in question. However, the results suggest that, when refurbish-
ment of units is possible, there is no reason as to why overcapacity would occur in the
first place as overinvestment does not take place in equilibrium under either mechanism.
Overcapacity may arise due to generators earning extra rent from energy markets through
some other mechanism which is leading to overcompensation and therefore excess capac-
ity. It is not clear that choosing a capacity payment mechanism to induce exit, correcting
for overcompensation in some other market mechanism, would bring about the optimal
solution.
It should be noted that the assumed maximum reliability level of 1 may be unrealistic;
however the relevant point is to assume that refurbishment can raise the reliability of a unit
to that of a new build. The relevant result is that maximum investment in refurbishment
takes place, which suggests that there is an incentive for generators to ensure their units
are as reliable as possible under both capacity payment mechanisms.
There are several potential extensions for this work. The first is to refine the assump-
tions surrounding refurbishment costs. Another possibility is to relax the assumption
around unlimited competition from new entrants, either by imposing extra costs on new
entrants or by employing a repeated game framework which we anticipate would alter
the results presented here. Finally a dynamic analysis, wherein we model multiple years,
would see the investment decisions change. We anticipate investment in baseload units
rather than peaking units would take place, as the extra hours of operation earning higher
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inframarginal rents would justify their capacity costs. We also anticipate investment by
firm one rather than seeing investment restricted to smaller firms.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a stochastic mixed complementarity model with endogenous proba-
bilities to investigate the impacts of two different capacity payment mechanisms in elec-
tricity markets. We compare a capacity payment on the basis of a fixed central pot
with a market-based reliability options method. We consider one integrated firm, holding
baseload, midmerit and peaking capacity, and three firms specialising in one technology
each. Generators are subject to forced outages and can refurbish their units to reduce the
probability of same.
We find with no refurbishment decisions allowed, total costs to consumers are lower
under a reliability options mechanism. However, both investment and generation are
higher under the pot mechanism. When refurbishment is allowed, consumer costs are
equal under both mechanisms. The exception is the case of initial levels of overcapacity
and low elasticity of demand, where consumer costs are slightly and significantly higher,
respectively.
Reliability options may reduce costs to consumers in the case of overcapacity in the
short run. However once the target level of capacity is achieved, they are likely to arrive
at a similar cost to consumers but with lower levels of generation. The pot mechanism
does not induce overinvestment, nor does it induce exit with overcapacity. Therefore the
reasons for overcapacity in a given system cannot be attributed to a pot mechanism alone
but rather a conflation of factors, of which a pot mechanism may be one. We leave the
identification of these factors for further research.
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Appendix
6.1 Capacity pot mechanism
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for all firms are given below using “perb”
notation, where 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 is equivalent to a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and a.b = 0.
0 ≤ invf,t ⊥ −cp+ ICOSTt −
∑
p,s
λ1f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (14)
0 ≤ genf,t,p,s ⊥ −prsBf,t,s(γp −MCt) + λ1f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (15)
0 ≤ exitf,t ⊥ cp−MCOSTt +
∑
p,s
λ1f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (16)
0 ≤ refurbf,t ⊥ −
∑
s
∂prs
∂refurbf,t
(
Bf,t,sgenf,t,p,s(γp,s −MCt)
)
+RCOSTt + λ2f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (17)
0 ≤ λ1f,t,p,s ⊥ −genf,t,p,s + invf,t + CAPt − exitf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (18)
0 ≤ λ2f,t ⊥ −Rf,t − refurbf,t +Rf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (19)
where
∂prs
∂refurbf,t
= (−1)1−Bf,t,s
∏
fˆ ,tˆ
fˆ 6=f
tˆ6=t
(Rfˆ ,tˆ + refurbfˆ ,tˆ)
Bfˆ ,tˆ,s(1−Rfˆ ,tˆ − refurbfˆ ,tˆ)1−Bfˆ ,tˆ,s , (20)
where fˆ and tˆ are dummy indices representing each firm and technology respectively except
firm f and technology t. Equations (14)-(19), along with market clearing conditions (5)
and (6), represent the full mixed complementarity problem for the capacity pot mechanism
problem.
6.2 Reliability options mechanism
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for all firms in the reliability options mech-
anism are
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0 ≤ invf,t ⊥ ICOSTt −
∑
p,s
λ1f,t,p,s − λ3f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (21)
0 ≤ genf,t,p,s ⊥ −prsBf,t,s(γp −MCt) + λ1f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (22)
0 ≤ exitf,t ⊥ −MCOSTt +
∑
p,s
λ1f,t,p,s + λ3f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (23)
0 ≤ refurbf,t ⊥ −
∑
s
∂prs
∂refurbf,t
(
Bf,t,sgenf,t,p,s(γp,s −MCt)− cap rof,trebatep,s
)
+RCOSTt + λ2f,t,p,s ≥ 0, ∀f, t,(24)
0 ≤ cap rof,t ⊥ −cp+
∑
p,s
prsrebatep,s + λ3f,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (25)
0 ≤ λ1f,t,p,s ⊥ −genf,t,p,s + invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, p, s, (26)
0 ≤ λ2f,t ⊥ −Rf,t − refurbf,t +Rf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t, (27)
0 ≤ λ3f,t ⊥ −cap rof,t + invf,t + CAPf,t − exitf,t ≥ 0, ∀f, t. (28)
Equations (21)-(28), along with market clearing conditions (11) - (13), represent the full
mixed complementarity problem for the reliability options mechanism problem.
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